London Olympics Bill - Standing Committee D

[Mr. David Amess in the Chair]

London Olympics Bill

Clause 17 - Advertising regulations

Don Foster: I beg to move amendment No. 73, in page 12, line 3, leave out
‘in the vicinity of London Olympics events’
and insert
‘during the London Olympics period which is displayed in or above stadia, venues and other competition areas that are considered as part of the London Olympic sites’.

David Amess: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 108, in page 12, line 12, at end insert ‘and’.
No. 109, in page 12, leave out lines 14 to 16.
No. 110, in page 12, line 28, after ‘apply’, insert
‘in relation to particular forms of advertising or particular places’.
No. 111, in page 12, line 29, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
‘(a)in any event the regulations shall in no case apply for a period exceeding the London Olympics period, and’.
No. 113, in clause 18, page 13, line 16, at end insert
‘for a period not exceeding the London Olympics period’.
No. 114, in page 13, line 31, after ‘advertising’, insert
‘during the London Olympics period’.

Don Foster: I am in some difficulty. I have a pretty lousy cold and, on the way to the Committee, the hon. Member for Sittingbourne and Sheppey (Derek Wyatt) and I discussed the current sweepstake among Labour Members on how long I intended to speak to the amendment. Given that I have a vague idea of the length of time that the hon. Gentleman wishes to speak, I shall be going for a little while as we have agreed a 50:50 split of all his winnings. On that basis, I shall begin with a few words of preamble.
We shall be dealing in today’s sitting with some of the most important and potentially the most controversial parts of the Bill. We have debated many issues and we shall debate more on which there is total unanimity that are about the importance of securing the delivery structures to ensure that we deliver on time and on budget in 2012 the best ever Olympic and Paralympic games.
I hope that it is recognised by all members of the Committee that it is crucial for the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games to raise the money that it needs to protect those organisations and individuals who willingly agree to give money through sponsorship to support the Olympic and Paralympic games. They must be provided with appropriate protection. The LOCOG briefing on market elements  stated that it was important to stress that LOCOG has to raise £510 million from UK sponsors and licensees as part of its £1.5 billion overall operating budget. Therefore, one third of LOCOG’s budget needs to come through sponsors, and we support the broad principle of the Government’s proposal.
However, I share several concerns that have been expressed about the detail and whether there is an element of gold-plating by the Government over and above that which is required in agreements with the International Olympic Committee, particularly in respect of the host city agreement. We shall deal later with clauses 31 and 32 when we discuss ambush marketing, but the summary of the host city contract demands that stakeholders
“take all necessary steps ... to prevent/or terminate any ambush marketing or any unauthorised use of Olympic properties”.
It states that the organising committee
“shall present the IOC with a detailed ambush prevention plan, in accordance with the terms of the Marketing Plan Agreement and the ‘Technical Manual on Brand Protection’, which forms an integral part of this Contract.”
Such details may sound like gobbledegook, but the host city contract refers specifically not only to the summary of the host city contract, but to several technical manuals that deal with the very details that we are discussing. Unfortunately, those manuals are not available to members of the Committee. They would have been enormously helpful had they been available during our deliberation of such issues. I accept that the Minister has been working hard with the IOC to find a way in which to make such information available, but it is important to place on the record that we do not have it. It is therefore difficult to determine whether the claim that is being made by some that the Government are gold-plating is true because we do not have the full detail to hand.
Clearly, there are issues in respect of ambush marketing, which we will return to later, but those areas that we are currently covering under clause 17 relate to other issues, such as time scale. At present, there is nothing in the Bill in respect of advertising that specifies the period of time for which these restrictions on advertising will apply. Of course, many of us presume that those rules will apply during the Olympic period and that that period can be clearly defined by reference to clause 1, which refers to “four weeks before” the start of the games until
“the fifth day after the day of the closing ceremony of the Paralympic Games”.
The first amendment in this string suggests that we specify that that is the period for which the rules in respect of advertising shall apply.
Clause 17 also refers to vicinity, but that is not defined in the legislation. Therefore, what do we mean when we talk about the area in which these rules on advertising are to apply? Another concern is the whole question of presumption of innocence as opposed to presumption of guilt; I will come on to that soon. Therefore, it is clear that there are areas of genuine concern in respect of advertising, and we have considerable difficulty with some of them, because we  do not know what it is that our country has signed up to; we simply do not have the documentation in front of us.
I state again that I want to help LOCOG protect the sponsors so that that £510 million can be raised. That is important, and I put on the record now that I support LOCOG in respect of adhering to any of the terms and conditions that it has agreed with the IOC and that are contained within the host city contract, and also within the technical manuals, which I have not seen. That seems to me to be a done deal, whether or not we have been involved in it. However, it is important that we tease out some of the details through our discussion of these amendments.
The first of the amendments under discussion is a probing amendment. I am the first to acknowledge that it contains deficiencies. For example, although it talks about the area to be covered, it does not include any reference to locations around the transport network—for instance, along the side of the planned Olympic javelin train or around the Olympic route network. I also accept that the amendment does not make any specific reference to the area immediately outside stadiums or other Olympic venues, and it is important that that is included in the discussion, and also in the rules.
Therefore, I acknowledge at the outset that the amendment has deficiencies. However, I believe that the clause is too broad in both allowing regulations on advertising as a whole, rather than in terms of just a display as our amendment suggests, and in not making any reference to the time period, which our amendment addresses by giving a specific period.
I hope that the Minister will put certain things on the record. I want him to acknowledge the concerns of the advertising and media industries, to undertake to consult them and the Opposition parties in good time before any regulations are issued, and to make it clear that the regulations are not intended to apply and will not be applied above and beyond the tightest definition of the host city contract and any other binding documents. I also want him to acknowledge an intended light-touch implementation—in other words, that newspaper hoardings that do not breach association rules under schedule 3, such as one bearing the title of the Evening Standard, will not constitute a breach of the regulations that are brought forward in due course. In other words, the regulations governed by the clause should relate to the physical display of advertising; the clause should not go broader than that, yet at the moment it gives the Secretary of State additional powers relating to advertising, over and beyond current law and the British code of advertising practice. For example, even though the regulations referred to under the clause discuss only the display of advertising, subsection (1) opens the door for the Secretary of State to make provision regarding the content of advertising. It would be wrong to have that in the clause, not least because the issue of content is covered adequately under clause 31 and schedule 3.
The point is clearly made that we need an agreement on the time limit. We propose the “London Olympics period”, which I have actually defined. Incidentally, I  notice that other amendments in this string have a similar effect; clearly, we are supportive of those amendments, but if ours were accepted, those would not be necessary.
There is also the issue of vicinity. I have said that we need a clear definition of what is understood by that. I appreciate the difficulty of coming up with a clear definition. Indeed, I will be absolutely honest—[Interruption.]—with you, Mr. Amess, if none of the rest of the Committee is listening: I had hoped to table an amendment that gave our own definition of “vicinity”. We spent a long time looking into what was proposed in Sydney and what was done in Atlanta and Athens, and we came to the conclusion that a definition would be extremely difficult to achieve. I, working with one or two members of my staff, am not capable of it, but I have absolute, supreme confidence that the Minister, with all his paraphernalia, back-up and support, is capable of coming up with something. We need such a definition, and it needs to be agreed by Parliament after consultation with all the bodies concerned.
Could the Minister be tempted to look into the Sydney legislation? I would argue that the Sydney proposals on vicinity were far too draconian and tight. It is all very well for the Minister to suggest that we provide something similarly draconian because we will have a light touch, and to say that there was only one prosecution in Sydney and so on, but until we know how the prosecution system will work, the situation will be very difficult.
Those are the key issues at the moment, but as I said, there are others to which we will wish to return, such as ambush marketing and being found guilty before evidence is provided—that seems to be suggested in the legislation, and we think it wrong. I hope that amendment No. 73, as a probing amendment, will at least persuade the Minister to tell us what he is doing on those various issues.

Maria Miller: I am the vice-chairman of the all-party advertising group, and I declare that as an interest.
All hon. Members here want to ensure the success of the 2012 London Olympics. Our amendments are designed to clarify certain aspects of the Bill to help ensure that we strike a balance between protecting the value of sponsoring and successfully using the Olympics as a catalyst for the wider economic and social good of our country. It is important that we acknowledge that there is a balance to be struck.
Sponsorship and licensing will yield an important income of about £510 million, as has been noted, but staging the Olympic games in London in 2012 will involve an estimated net public subsidy of about £1.1 billion. An initial report, commissioned in May 2002 through Arup, on the costs and benefits of the Olympics stressed the importance of maximising the value of what it referred to as “second order benefits”—that is, economic benefits that are not a direct result of the staging or sponsorship of the games—in order to help eliminate what was defined  then as a financial burden. It is with that objective in mind that I speak to amendments Nos. 73, 108 to 111, 113 and 114.
I support amendment No. 73 because the Bill’s wording, which gives the Secretary of State power to make regulations about advertising in the vicinity of the London Olympics events, is far too imprecise, particularly for the advertising industry. Clause 17 provides the Government with, frankly, quite unfettered powers. What would “vicinity” mean for events in London? Until when would the clause remain in operation? The Government’s objective in the Bill should be to ensure that we meet the IOC standards as set out in the host city contract and in the technical manuals that the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Foster) referred to earlier, which have unfortunately yet to be made available to Committee members.
Specifically, the host city contract states that
“no Olympic venues or major access points leading to the Olympic venue shall be encumbered during the period of the games by any franchise or concession or any other commercial agreement, including the right to name the venue to promote ... any third-party’s products ... that would conflict with ... any agreement entered into by the IOC”.
That indicates to me that the amendment as presented would be entirely in the spirit and the word of the host city contract. The London Organising Committee has written to me previously to say that it feels that Parliament should decide on this issue. Indeed, the Government’s own regulatory impact assessment clearly states that this requirement needs to be
“strictly limited in time and geography”
to minimise the impact on competition. There is some clear evidence, Mr. Amess, that the probing amendment should be taken seriously.
I have also received representations from various media organisations, both directly and through the Advertising Association, that express considerable concern at the possible detrimental impact on outdoor advertising, on the national and regional press and on broadcasters that would arise from the imprecision of the term “vicinity”. Those media fear that the clause creates a high degree of uncertainty and is inoperable as it stands.
To return to my earlier comments on the need to maximise those second-order benefits, we really need some clarity on the issue today. It is not sufficient for the Government to leave such wide scope for intervention. Clarity is required, and the amendment provides that, so we support it.
Amendment No. 115 is aimed at ensuring that any secondary legislation that is subsequently issued under clause 17 is as clear as possible—again to achieve some of the certainty that is required. I therefore propose to delete
“,or provide criteria for determining”,
because that implies that the Government could have several goes at amending the regulation, and that merely adds uncertainty. The deletion of subsection  (3)(c) is essential. It opens up the entire debate about vicinity, which we have already said is proving problematic.
Amendments Nos. 110 and 111 give the Secretary of State all the flexibility that is required to apply the regulations appropriately and proportionately. Certain forms of advertising may be acceptable in some locations but not in others. I tabled an amendment to subsection (6)(a) because it is not specific enough and leaves the Secretary of State with too much leeway to decide the period for which regulations should apply.
The regulatory impact assessment is useful in this matter. It clearly states that marketing measures need to be
“strictly limited in time and geography”
to minimise the impact on competition. We see no need for the regulations to apply for longer than the duration of the Olympic period, as has already been stated.
Finally, through amendments Nos. 113 and 114, we want the Government either to amend clause 18(1)(a) in Committee, or perhaps to clarify through Hansard that they are talking only about the limitations as set out in clause 17(2). The purpose of the amendments is to limit the application of the regulations to the Olympic period. The Bill’s current terminology is far too vague, is open-ended and causes a sense of uncertainty. Much of this goes back to terminology adopted in amendment No. 73. There is a need to talk about the London Olympic period, rather than leaving this important issue liable to change at a later date.
I ask the Minister to consider the amendments and I stress the importance of striking a balance. We need to protect the value of sponsorship in the Olympics. I speak with first-hand knowledge in that respect, having spent nearly 20 years in advertising and marketing. Indeed, at one point I worked for an Olympic sponsor company in the Barcelona Olympics. The issue is not only about protecting those interests but the need to obtain the wider social and economic benefit.

Richard Caborn: The point made in the closing remarks of the hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mrs. Miller) is right. The issue is how we obtain the balance. That involves maximising the income from what will be clean stadiums. I am sure that she would be the first to admit that if we get that wrong, do not get the revenue streams from advertising and therefore do not get the money from the IOC that we require, the burden will fall somewhere. It could be on the very people whom she is trying to protect: council tax payers in London. Therefore, it is important that we get the balance right.
Much reference has been made to the technical manuals on the host city agreement. This morning, we received some information from the IOC that ought to be shared with the Committee; it has released some of the technical details. I am getting used to handing documents out. It is like a tutorial. I have yet another document to hand round to the Committee. This time  it does not involve graphics. There are a few words in it, so it might be difficult for the hon. Member for Bath to digest, but I have no doubt that he will do his best.

Don Foster: Is it in colour this time?

Richard Caborn: I will get the hon. Gentleman some crayons later.
The document arrived this morning. A number of technical manuals in draft have been released to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport to assist work on the staging of the games. The IOC is still reviewing the contents of manuals ahead of producing its final version. The manuals have been given to us on the strict understanding that the information contained in them is of a confidential nature. As Members will appreciate, it is important that we in the DCMS and in Government maintain a good relationship with the IOC and respect that confidentiality.
However, I am pleased to say that while the IOC has not agreed to publication of the manuals, this morning it provided us with a summary of those requirements that require legislative action. It has agreed that that can be made available to the Committee to assist in the consideration of the Bill. Most of it will probably relate to this afternoon’s debate.
I hope that the document provides helpful background. I can give Members a summary of the key points and hope that the details will be useful to them ahead of the debate on advertising and ambush marketing, which I think will take place this afternoon. I know that some Members have concerns that we have exceeded the IOC requirements in this area. I think that the words “gold-plating” were used.
The IOC’s definition of ambush marketing is
“any attempt by an individual or an entity to create an unauthorized or false association (whether or not commercial) with the Olympic Games, the Olympic Movement, the IOC, the National Olympic Committee of the Host Country or the Organising Committee of Olympic Games (“OCOG”) thereby interfering with the legitimate contractual rights of official marketing partners of the Olympic Games.”
The document then outlines the IOC requirements in terms of legislative action to combat ambush marketing. It states:
“The IOC, as early as in the phase of bidding for the Olympic Games, requires a guarantee from Candidate Cities confirming that, prior to the commencement of the Olympic Games, legislation will be passed in the Host Country which is necessary to effectively reduce and sanction ambush marketing, and to eliminate street vending and control advertising space (including air space) during the period of the Olympic Games ... The London Bid Committee has provided a guarantee to this effect.”
The IOC asked LOCOG to
“work to develop and gain approval for the following types of legislation: specific legislation to protect Olympic intellectual property and to prohibit use of confusingly similar words, symbols, terminology and graphic design as well as the unauthorised use of Olympic intellectual properties; Games operations legislation that places restrictions and sanctions on billboard and airspace advertising, street vending, ambush marketing, airspace and other aspects affecting Games-time operations; legislation to combat forms of ambush marketing which are not caught by the above-mentioned legislation but which nevertheless damage the OCOG’s ability to finance and stage a successful Olympic Games.”
On the question of ticket touting, the IOC requires laws that forbid individuals from profiting from selling tickets at above face value, and from advertising and executing such sales. The IOC’s view is that ticket touting is detrimental to the image of the Olympic games, particularly at games time.
That is an explanation of the note that I have just passed round the Committee. I have no doubt that when hon. Members have digested it they will agree that it is probably more germane to this afternoon’s discussion than it is to this debate. However, it is useful information. We are in discussion with the IOC pretty well all the time now, and we will try to pass on to the Committee any further information that we receive from it. I agree with the hon. Member for Bath that it is difficult to have this type of important debate, and to get the balance right—we are all agreed that we must try to get the balance right—without having the IOC’s view. If one reflects on what the IOC says, we are definitely not putting gold-plating into the Bill—if anything we are tending marginally towards the other side.
Before I return to discussing the amendments, I want to put on record the definition of what we call in broad terms the vicinity, and to explain why we do not want to include that in the Bill. We will ensure that regulations are targeted, proportionate and consistent with the European convention on human rights. We intend that the regulations should apply only in the small areas around venues and events that are likely to be full of spectators or captured on camera. In most cases, that is what “vicinity” should mean. We do not want to draw up a blanket definition for inclusion in the Bill because the requirements will be different for different venues. In the close confines of a city centre football stadium, for instance, it would not be proportionate to impose the same sort of restrictions that we might apply to stand-alone Olympic park venues. We have therefore allowed for the regulations to specify a different definition of vicinity for different venues.
When we talk about vicinity, we mean a few hundred metres. In Sydney, to which the hon. Member for Bath referred, the restriction zone was more extreme, at 3 km but, as the hon. Gentleman knows, that restriction was for the Olympic park, which was situated well outside the main city centre, and so was quite confining,. Those sorts of restrictions would clearly not be suitable for a good number of the venues in the UK, and we would not try to impose the type of blanket approach that was used in Sydney.
I am trying to indicate to the Committee that the regulations will be proportionate, both for those who want to exploit the games in the best possible way, and for the protection that the IOC demands for those who put huge amounts of money into advertising. After Los Angeles, there was a great deal of criticism of the IOC, with some justification. It was claimed that sport was following advertising rather than advertising following sport.
In Sydney, we saw a return to the basic principles of the five rings—that is, sport. Although we need commercial sponsors, there is a balance to be  maintained, and we do not want that aspect to dominate the sport. We learned a lot from the shots that went out on television from Los Angeles.

Maria Miller: When does the Minister plan to identify the areas around the many venues? Understanding the timing that he has in mind will help us and perhaps allay our concerns.

Richard Caborn: Once the Bill has become an Act, we will do that quite quickly. My officials are scribing like mad to give me an indication of what the timing might be, so if the hon. Lady will bear with me, I will come back to her in a moment.
The hon. Member for Bath made a point about consulting the advertising industry. He rightly pointed out that there is no requirement for the Secretary of State to do that, but I can give a commitment now from the Front Bench that we will do so. It would be foolish not to consult the industry.
I think that the answer to the hon. Lady’s question will be a good one when it comes. I suggest that once the Bill has been enacted, regulations will be made closer to 2012—that is very perceptive of me—and in good time for proper consultations. There will be at least two years’ notice for those affected. Clause 21(2) concerns the Olympic delivery authority and states:
“In exercising their function under subsection (1), the Authority shall ... aim to give two years’ notice of the general nature of the regulations, and ... aim to give six months’ notice of the detailed provisions of the regulations.”
I hear what the hon. Lady has said and shall write to her in due course.
Amendments Nos. 73, 108 to 111, 113 and 114 are aimed at defining more closely the geographical scope of restrictions on advertising and the period during which restrictions should apply. The IOC requires all host cities to control advertising in and around Olympic venues and the control of advertising space within venues is already accounted for by virtue of LOCOG’s contractual arrangements with venues for 2012. The IOC requires that there should be no commercial sponsorship in the field of play at an Olympic venue and LOCOG has negotiated agreements to that end with the venues for 2012.
However, the IOC also requires us to control advertising beyond that which appears in and around Olympic venues. I therefore cannot agree to amendments Nos. 73, 108 or 109 as they would prevent us from honouring our commitments to the IOC. The IOC requires a control of advertising in the vicinity of the venues to maintain an appropriate look and feel to the games, ultimately to protect the Olympics from becoming over-commercialised. The uncontrolled commercialism of the Atlanta games led the IOC to require all host cities to control advertising in and around venues, especially within the sightline of cameras that broadcast images of the games around the world. That requirement is set out in clause 46 of the host city contract.
I reassure Committee members that we will ensure that regulations are targeted and proportionate and consistent with the European convention on human rights. We shall draw the regulations as tightly as we can around the venues, mainly to ensure that unauthorised advertising is not a problem in the concourse areas surrounding the venues or within the sight of the TV cameras.
Clause 17 allows a different definition of “vicinity” to be drawn up for different venues, to take account of the different geographical and commercial settings of the Millennium stadium and the canoeing at Broxbourne, for example. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendments.

Don Foster: Perhaps I missed it, although I thought that I was listening carefully. How long will the regulations on advertising apply? When will the start and finish be?

Richard Caborn: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman knows that that issue will be addressed in my response to the next batch of amendments. [Interruption.] If the hon. Gentleman will bear with me, I shall explain. Amendment No. 110 would require that the regulations specify how different forms of advertising are to be restricted for different periods of time. I cannot accept the amendment; we intend to draft regulations that will specify the type of advertising to be prohibited. We also intend that regulations should provide clear exceptions to such prohibitions. It will also be possible to vary those exceptions from one venue to the next.
However, if we also vary the timetable for the application of restrictions, depending on the type of advertising involved, that could be too onerous and confusing to those who may be affected. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that restrictions will be in place for as short a time as possible. That brings me on to the remaining amendments of the group.

Hugh Robertson: What is the argument against simply restricting those provisions to the Olympic period? That would be simple, straightforward and clear-cut.

Richard Caborn: I shall come to that.
Amendments Nos. 111, 113 and 114 would limit the time during which restrictions could apply to the “London Olympics period”—the two-month period encompassing the Olympics and the Paralympics. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we intend to take a more targeted approach in making regulations than that suggested by the amendments.
We have already provided in subsection (6) that the regulations shall apply only for a period which the Secretary of State considers is necessary to comply with IOC requirements. It is our clear intention that regulations should apply only to the period immediately surrounding particular Olympic and  Paralympic events. There is a gap of 21 days or thereabouts between the Olympics and the Paralympics.

Don Foster: Can the Minister confirm that the maximum period that will apply to any venue, stadium or location will be the Olympic period, but because there is a wish to be sensitive and proportionate, for particular venues it might be for a period that is shorter than the Olympic period?

Richard Caborn: That is correct. Let us take, for example, a football ground, at which one set of matches would be played—it would be ludicrous to say that restrictions there should be extended to the whole of the Olympic period. It is about being proportionate, while complying with the IOC requirements. There is a balance to be struck.
We have drafted the clause in such a way that these issues are dealt with in the regulations, which can be applied differently to distinct venues. That ensures a balanced approach on a case-by-case and venue-by-venue basis. If we adopted a blanket approach to defining the relevant time period or vicinity, we would risk creating a disproportionately restrictive regime. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman not to press the amendment.

Don Foster: This has been, as I hoped, a useful debate. We have teased some more detail out of the Minister. Perhaps, more importantly, we have teased out of the IOC at least part of the relevant technical manuals that we will be able to study for any future discussion of the legislation. I am grateful to the Minister and his colleagues for achieving that for us too. May I thank him for what have been largely positive responses? I sought an absolute assurance that he would consult the relevant bodies about advertising; he has given that assurance. I sought an assurance that the regulations would be appropriate and proportionate; he has given us that assurance.
The Minister told us that there is a maximum time period for operation which is the Olympic period and that there will be opportunities for much shorter periods for some venues. I am grateful for that. He also indicated that although we do not have the full details—they will come out in regulations—the distances that were used in Sydney are greater than the distances to be used in London. I welcome that. I am also grateful to him for at least giving some sort of assurance that the regulations will be provided well before the Olympics start. I confess that if the Minister is seriously telling us that those regulations will be available only two years before the Olympics, in 2010, it is far too late. I hope that when he writes to us, as promised, he will have reflected on that time scale.
We have received many of the assurances that I sought, and I am grateful to the Minister. We will have an opportunity to debate some of these issues again in more detail on other amendments, and I am grateful for that. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Don Foster: I beg to move amendment No. 19, in page 12, leave out line 5 and insert—
‘(2)‘Regulations made pursuant to subsection (1) above shall not impose any requirement or make any restriction in respect of the display, presentation or content of advertising other than is necessary for the purposes of—’.

David Amess: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 20, in page 12, line 6, leave out ‘shall aim to secure’ and insert ‘securing’.
No. 21, in page 12, line 8, leave out
‘shall have regard to any’
and insert ‘compliance with any mandatory’.
No. 22, in page 12, line 8, leave out ‘or guidance’.
No. 23, in page 12, line 10, leave out
‘may also have regard to’
and insert ‘the consideration of’.
No. 107, in page 12, line 10, leave out ‘amenity and’ and insert ‘securing’.
No. 112, in clause 18, page 13, line 15, leave out from ‘may,’ to ‘disapply’ and insert
‘for the purposes set out in section 17(2) only,’.

Don Foster: These are relatively simple but important amendments. They pick up a theme that we have already been debating, namely the desire to ensure that any regulations that are developed and any action that is taken will not go beyond the requirements of the host contracts and any other agreements with the IOC while at the same time recognising the importance of those agreements to ensure that we and LOCOG can deliver the requirements; any potential sponsors will understandably have to ensure that they get a fair deal for their sponsorship. The amendments go beyond that and would ensure that advertising and other businesses are not unreasonably constrained by advertising regulation because others will continue to trade and operate and will want to advertise their goods and services even if they are not directly linked to, or a sponsor of, the Olympics or the Paralympic games. It is important to ensure that the Government introduce a soft-touch policy in relation to all businesses in the United Kingdom so that all of them can benefit from the Olympics and the Paralympics coming to London and the UK in 2012. It is crucial that everybody should benefit, not just those who agree to be sponsors.
Even if the Minister does not accept the amendments, I hope that he will place firmly on the record his assurance that nothing will be done that is over and beyond what is required by the host city contract. The Minister’s response to my earlier amendments implied that he was not convinced that they were doing as much as was required by the host city contract. That slightly worried me and I am sure it was not what he intended to convey.
The final amendment in the group raises another crucial issue which has not been mentioned: it relates to the guidelines from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in respect of amenity and public safety. It is where I might part company with the hon. Member for Basingstoke and her amendment.
My amendment is tabled in order that all the advertising regulations that might be made comply with the ODPM guidelines on amenity and public safety. The basis for it is the ODPM’s document “Outdoor advertisements and signs: a guide for advertisers”, which states:
“In deciding whether to approve your application, the planning authority may consider only two issues: these are described in the rules as the interests of amenity and public safety”.
It continues:
“In practice, ‘amenity’ is usually understood to mean the effect upon visual amenity in the immediate neighbourhood of displaying the advertisement, or using an advertisement site, where passers-by or people living there, will be aware of the advertisement. So in assessing amenity, the planning authority will always consider the local characteristics of the neighbourhood. For example, if your advertisement will be displayed in the locality where there are important scenic, historic, architectural or cultural features, the planning authority will consider whether it is in scale and in keeping with these features.”
Amenity is important and we need to ensure that any advertising is in sympathy with the surroundings. Clearly, the ODPM agrees, and we argue that in the Government’s regulations on advertising relating to the Olympics and during the Olympic time period the same rules should apply to ensure, for example—let us not be rude to any sponsor—that we do not have blazing neon lights advertising a product on an historic building in the centre of the wonderful city of Bath, which would be inappropriate. I hope there will be no loophole in the regulations that would enable that to happen, however important the advertiser might be in terms of its sponsorship of the Olympics.

Maria Miller: We support the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bath, which create a new subsection that must be read with clause 17(1). The amendments clarify the purpose of clause 17, which is to impose vicinity restrictions on advertising but within clear parameters, that is, conformity with the host city contract or to comply with mandatory requests from the IOC to secure public safety.
I have tabled a separate amendment—amendment No. 107—the purpose of which is to delete the reference to having “regard to amenity”. It is a probing amendment to tease out the Government’s intention. Perhaps it is having spent 20 years in advertising that has made me interested in whether the reference to amenity means that the Government will look at the content of the advertising, rather than just the physical siting of it. What they mean in this context is unclear to me, and I would be pleased if the Minister could reassure me by elaborating on the matter.
The amendment adds the word “securing” so that the subsection make sense, and to reflect the importance of maintaining public safety during the Olympics. The only criteria that should be taken into account in making the regulations are the contractual requirements, as discussed before, or public safety.
Amendment No. 112 changes clause 18 and adds to it a reference to clause 17, and we therefore believe that it should be subservient to clause 17. That being the case, why do the Government refer to
“specified extent or for specified purposes”
in clause 18(1)(a)? What will be specified? Surely, that has already been made clear in clause 17(2). We want the Government to amend that, or to clarify what is being talked about.
Again, this very much goes back to the terminology adopted in our amendments to clause 17(1) and the need to talk about the “London Olympics period” instead of leaving important issues open. Perhaps some of the Minister’s comments this morning have allayed our concerns on the matter of time, but it might be worth reiterating them.

Richard Caborn: The regime for controlling advertising in the vicinity of Olympic venues that we are creating by virtue of clause 17 is a response to the requirements of the IOC. I want to reassure members that we are not gold-plating the IOC’s requirements. If there is a different interpretation of what I said, let me be clear: what I said was that we have gone no further than what the IOC asked us to do in terms of its technical manuals. I hope that that shows that we are genuinely reflecting the IOC’s requirements, and not gold-plating them.
The Bill, and the provisions in clause 17, present a practical way of making good on our promises. I also want to reassure Members that in drawing up regulations under clause 17 we will limit their application as much as we can—both in time and in scope —thereby ensuring that what we do is reasonable and proportionate.
However, I am also clear that we must have flexibility in our approach, to allow us to respond appropriately to any changing demands by the IOC—and there will be some—and to enable us to react to any new or innovative ambush marketing techniques that might arise between now and 2012. A flexible approach to the regulatory regime under clause 17 also means that we can ensure that our regulations are fit for purpose. Clause 17 allows the Secretary of State to respond intelligently to any new IOC guidance. She can appropriately balance her duties and responsibilities, and flexibility is allowed for in implementing any new IOC demands. This flexibility is not built into the clause because of any hidden agenda. Rather, it also allows the Secretary of State to take into account any advice from the IOC about how we can improve the operation of the games in 2012.
The IOC may suggest something to us, but not formalise that suggestion by means of a mandatory obligation in the host city contract. The clause as drafted allows the Secretary of State to respond accordingly to that advice while also balancing it with any other duties or responsibilities that she may have.

Don Foster: The Minister said something that I am sure that I should have been aware of, but which I was not, so can he confirm to the Committee what he has  just said? Did he say that the IOC can make mandatory requirements at a later stage that will have the effect of changing the host city contract?

Richard Caborn: The IOC may suggest something to us, but not formalise that suggestion by means of a mandatory obligation under the host city contract.

Don Foster: Will the Minister reflect on what he said immediately before the information that he read out, when he said that we might receive some advice from the IOC that would not be mandatory? He will see from his notes that he said earlier that some mandatory requirements could change the host city contract. If that is so, will he confirm that the contract must be agreed by both sides and that it cannot just be the IOC that says that the contract has to be changed?

Richard Caborn: The IOC can change the technical manuals that are part of the contract, which would then become mandatory. The answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is yes, the manuals could be changed under discretion orders. However, the Secretary of State has been given the flexibility to respond between now and 2012 to new developments that might take place. We do not know about them now, but they would necessitate such flexibility if they were drawn too tightly. If we do not give her that flexibility, we would have to return to the House to enable her to have such power. That is not the right way in which to go about matters.
There is no doubt that there will be changes, given the way in which technology is now moving. We want therefore to make measures fit for purpose so that we can respond in a practical way to any new demands that may be put on us, either from the IOC or ones that we may find ourselves. That is the object of the clause. The answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is yes, mandatory changes can be made to the technical manuals that are part of the contract.

Maria Miller: Will the Minister elaborate on such matters? Will there be a cut-off date beyond which mandatory changes or otherwise could take place? When considering the planning of activity to support the Olympic games, many people will need to have clarity in respect of when changes can take place and beyond which time changes cannot take place? They will want certainty in such situations.

Richard Caborn: Depending on what they were, changes could be taken up until 2012. In the absence of specific issues, it is difficult to know. I should have thought that the powers would go up to 2012. I stress that we are trying to frame an Act that gives the Secretary of State, with all the caveats that I have mentioned, the ability to respond to both the IOC and the changing world of technology. I will write to the hon. Lady, but I understand that the IOC can change the manuals up to 2012 and the operation of the games.
The clause allows the Secretary of State to respond accordingly to the advice while balancing it with any other duties or responsibilities that she may have. Amendments Nos. 19, 20, 21 and 22 essentially probe the issue of whether we are gold-plating IOC  requirements in drawing up our regulatory regime and would ensure that the Secretary of State sticks rigidly to the obligations imposed by the host city contract. While I understand the aim of the amendments, I do not consider that they are wholly desirable. I hope that the assurance that I have given members of the Committee about how the Secretary of State will draw up the regulations under the clause shows that we are intending to be as reasonable and proportionate as possible.
Amendment No. 23 would made a consequential change to subsection (2)(c), as a result of the proposed effect of amendments Nos. 19 to 22. For the reasons that I have already given, I am not willing to change the structure of the clause or accept amendments Nos. 19 to 22. I am not prepared to accept amendment No. 23. I therefore ask hon. Members to withdraw amendments Nos. 19 to 23.
Amendment No. 107 would again limit the Secretary of State’s discretion in making regulations in ways that I cannot accept. It would remove the concept of “amenity” from the list of issues that the Secretary of State may consider when making regulations. I think that the hon. Member for Bath supports the proposition that “amenity” is an important concept; it allows regulations to make allowances for the different characteristics and different geography of particular venues or sites.
By including the concept of amenity in the Bill, we have reflected the drafting of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Its inclusion should help the Secretary of State to tailor regulations to the areas that they affect, rather than adopting a blanket approach. In short, it should make the regulations more proportionate. I would therefore like to keep the concept in the Bill and I ask the hon. Member for Basingstoke not to press the amendment.
Amendment No. 112 would prevent regulations from amending existing legislation except for the purposes set out in clause 17(2). I do not think that that is necessary. Clause 17 establishes how the Secretary of State should go about making regulations. The principal considerations are set out in subsection (2), but the Secretary of State will be entitled to balance those considerations with others—for instance, compatibility with the European convention on human rights. With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Lady will not press the amendment.

Maria Miller: I thank the Minister for clarifying the situation on amendment No. 107 and I will not press that, but I remain concerned about the IOC’s ability to make changes right up to the date of the games and I ask the Minister whether he could seek reassurances from the IOC that that would be done only in the case of extreme problems and only in a minimal way, to try to get some security on the matter.

Richard Caborn: I will do that. We have gone through the track record on this issue and I have looked at what has happened with previous games, particularly the games in Sydney and Athens, which obviously reflect the modern games. The IOC is not a body that will use its powers to start making changes unnecessarily. For  the hon. Lady, I will look back and see whether the host city contract was changed in any significant way for previous games. There was only one prosecution in this area in relation to the Sydney games. This is about using common sense and the balance that I set out earlier between those who bring in huge amounts of money in terms of advertising and protecting that, which we get a lot of benefit from, and ensuring that others who rightly want to be able to use the Olympic games for all sorts of other reasons to do with employment and so on can do so, too. We are trying to achieve a balance. I hear what the hon. Lady said and I will look at what happened in previous games in respect of which the host city contract was changed. I will then write to her and other members of the Committee.

Don Foster: I do not think that the Minister has quite twigged the concern among Opposition Members and in the outside world. On many occasions, he has stated that it is the Government’s intention to be reasonable and to take action that is proportionate and given the assurance that the Government are not gold-plating, and so on. We take the Minister at his word, but he may not be the Minister with responsibility for this issue as we get nearer to the games, although I hope that he is, in view of the work that he has done. Clearly, scrutinising legislation is about getting firmly on to the record absolute assurances that other Ministers, in other times, will not take a different view from the one taken by this Minister.
That is why the amendment takes a clear approach. It says that nothing shall be done other than that which has been agreed to as part of the host city contract and any other binding documents with the IOC. I accept what the Minister says, which is that, in the light of the changing world in which we live, where advertisers will come up with new gimmicks and where there will be new media and platforms through which to operate, it makes sense to have up-to-date advice on how to stick within the spirit of what is intended. However, the Minister has still not quite grasped that although we may trust him, his officials and his Secretary of State, there is a concern that things are not being placed as tightly as we would like in the Bill.
In one particular area, I was, I have to say, very disappointed with the Minister. He said that he was not prepared to accept amendments Nos. 19, 20, 21 and 22 and that he hoped that amendment No. 23 would be withdrawn. However, amendment No. 23 is about a totally different issue and that does not logically follow. Just because he wants me not to press four of the amendments, it does not mean I will happily not press the fifth one.
I will give the Minister a chance to put on record what his objection is to amendment No. 23, which is clear. In relation to advertising, subsection (2)(c) says that, in making regulations, the Secretary of State
“may also have regard to amenity and public safety.”
Another Department says that amenity and public safety are the most important things in relation to outdoor advertising, so surely we cannot leave it that the Secretary of State “may” take some vague interest in the matter and “may” put something in regulations about it.
Since the regulations will be all-powerful in respect of advertising during the Olympic period, surely we ought to have evidence of joined-up thinking, particularly in an area which both the ODPM and I think are important. I will waffle on for a second until the Minister intervenes on me and gives me an answer. He is about to do that, and I look forward to it.

Richard Caborn: Obviously, the hon. Gentleman has been offended by some of the words that I have used this morning. I will probably get the scriptwriter to change them and not be quite as direct as the script was telling me to be.
There are two important points. First, this issue is not just about dealing with what the IOC are rightly demanding in relation to the host city contract. It is also about trying to look to the future and what might happen between now and 2012, so that we do not have to return to the House all the time. Everyone acknowledges that the Bill is all about putting in place a structure that is accountable to Parliament, but which allows us to get on, to build the facilities, to organise the games and to present the best run Olympic games ever in 2012. If we add the referral back to Parliament for different actions, we will end up defeating the object of the exercise. I do not think that there is any major disagreement about what we are trying to do.
The safety valve is that any new regulation would have to come back to the House to be debated and agreed. Part of the concern of the hon. Member for Basingstoke was that the IOC could come along with new requests or guidance. However, we would have to bring any new regulation back to the House.
I will re-examine the matter, but this is about future-proofing as well as dealing with what is in the host city contract now. We are trying to draw that balance in the clause, so that we can deliver the contracts out there and get the show on the road.
I agree that the concept of amenity is vital. That is why it is included; the Secretary of State must have regard to amenity under subsection (2)(c). That is why we resist amendment No. 107, which would remove the concept of amenity. The concept that we have included in the Bill is the same as is defined in the ODPM’s guidance.

Don Foster: I apologise, but will the Minister just read out his brief again, because he just said to the Committee that it is clear that, under clause 17(2)(c), the Secretary of State must have regard to amenity. Will he confirm that that is what he read out, because that is not what it says in the Bill? If he wishes to change the word “may” to the word “must”, I will accept that as his drafting amendment and we can all carry on with the next business. However, the Bill says “may” and not “must”.

Richard Caborn: I will reflect on the hon. Gentleman’s comments. He has his usual hawk eye in going through the clause and dare I say that he has caught my officials out. I will return to him on that.

Don Foster: I am extremely grateful to the Minister, but may I gently say that I have no desire to catch any of his officials out, although I might from time to time wish to catch him out? If I have done so and it will cause him to reflect on this important issue and to return to us on it in due course with some further thoughts, that gives me good reason not to press the matter. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Don Foster: I beg to move amendment No. 72, in clause 17, page 12, line 17, leave out from ‘kind’ to end of line 20.

David Amess: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 66, in clause 17, page 12, line 21, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
‘(5)The regulations shall apply only in respect of the display of advertising in any medium in accordance with subsection (1).’.
No. 31, in clause 18, page 13, line 16, leave out ‘control’ and insert ‘display’.

Don Foster: I do not know how the hon. Member for Sittingbourne and Sheppey is getting on with his bets—

Derek Wyatt: Keep going.

Don Foster: He suggests that I should keep going, but I was hoping not to do so for much longer, because I am feeling worse and worse as time progresses. It is amazing how much support I get from all parts of the Committee for raising such important issues. It is shortly time for others to have a go as well, and the Committee will, no doubt, be pleased about that.
The amendments are important and are intended to tease out from the Government whether a fear that many people have, which I share, is realistic. The Committee will acknowledge that, during the most fantastic Olympics and Paralympics ever, newspapers will report what is going on. We certainly hope so. We hope that they will be celebrating some fantastic home team successes; I am sure that they will. Even if not, they will want to celebrate a fantastic games and Paralympics and to toast their overall success. However, as I understand them, the proposals could inhibit the ability of established companies to sell newspapers reporting those events. I shall return to reporting when we discuss later amendments but, in the context of these amendments, I will narrow down the argument to the display notices about newspapers.
Amendment No. 72 is centred around the following argument, and if the Minister can tell me that it is wrong, that will be fantastic. As I understand it, subsection (4) spreads the net of the regulations beyond what is generally regarded as advertising. The definition would apparently encompass a great many media messages, including, for example, newspaper billboards and commercial signage of all kinds. The  amendment would restrict the scope of the regulations governing advertising by removing subsections (4)(a) and (4)(b).
Subsection (4)(a) would include
“advertising of a non-commercial nature”
under the remit of the regulations. I have spoken to nobody—I am grateful to the Newspaper Society for its help—who has been able to tell me what “non-commercial advertising” means. The Minister might be able to assure me that he knows exactly what it means, and why it has to be covered in the regulations. That would solve all my problems—or at least some of them—and I look forward to his attempts to do so. However, I have some difficulty with non-commercial advertising, because an advertisement, after all, is an advertisement, whatever its form.
Subsection (4)(b) is also unwarranted, as it incorporates into the regulations
“announcements or notices of any kind.”
Again, I do not know what would be covered. Surely a notice or an announcement is not an advertisement, and should not be treated for the purpose of the advertising regulations for London 2012 as the same thing. If the legislation stands, a newspaper’s vending stand with a headline on it such as “X does well” could presumably be construed as an advertisement rather than a notice. The question is: does that mean, for instance, that an Evening Standard billboard that says, “Olympics success by X, Y or Z” is going to be banned if it appears on the forecourt of a station that is being used to take people by train to the Olympic park? I have real difficulty with what is intended to be included, and that is why my amendments simplify the situation.
Amendment No. 66 continues the same theme. Subsection (5) seeks to include unnecessary examples that start to distort the meaning of advertising. The reference to
“distribution or provision of documents or articles”
in subsection (5)(a), especially when read in conjunction with subsection (4), could bring newspapers themselves within the ambit of the regulations because they carry advertisements. Are we saying that a newspaper with advertisements in it could not be distributed? What would that come under? Would it be considered a notice? Clearly, that would be unacceptable. I and many others are confused about that.
The phrase
“display or projection of words, images, lights or sounds”
appears to encompass any commercial broadcasting. Does that mean that a television set in the window of a television sales shop with advertising on it will be caught? What if the televisions in that shop are displaying activities taking place at the Olympics?
The Minister will say that I am talking gobbledegook, that I need not fear, and that none of those examples is intended to be covered by the regulations. If he says that newspaper vendors’ sale boards will be okay, that newspapers carrying advertisements will be okay, and that shops can continue to have their televisions working as people walk by in the vicinity of an Olympic venue, I will sit  down and be a happy bunny. I suspect that I might not hear anything quite so simple from the Minister, but I look forward to hearing him try to convince me.

Maria Miller: I, too, am concerned that the Bill may go well beyond advertising alone. Advertising is, by definition, commercial, and the Bill refers to
“announcements or notices of any kind.”
That could infringe on a great number of other communications that I am sure it was not Government’s intention to affect. We require some clarity on that.
We support amendment No. 72 because it would not dilute the application of the regulations, and deleting subsection (4)(a) and (b) would create more clarity. In particular,
“announcements or notices of any kind”
could encompass editorial material, and I simply do not believe that that could be the intention of the Government. That is why we fully endorse the deletion of that provision. The Government need to clarify their intentions, and this catch-all clause upsets the balance of what we are trying to do under the Bill.
We also support amendment No. 66, which would delete subsection (5)(a) to (c). Paragraphs (a) to (c) are dangerously broad in scope, and go well beyond advertising to cover, potentially, editorial content in any medium. I cannot believe that that is the intention of the Government. We would welcome clarification on those issues.

Richard Caborn: I will deal first with amendments Nos. 72, 66 and 31, and then with the secondary legislation.
The requirement that is created under the clause for controlling advertising in the vicinity of the Olympic venues is a response to a requirement of the International Olympic Committee; I think that that is understood. The host city contract states that we must ensure that no propaganda or advertising is placed within or outside venues so as to be within sight of television cameras. We are also required to control ambush marketing. We have decided to leave much of the detail of these controls to secondary legislation to ensure that we have flexibility in our approach, to allow us to respond to the demands of the IOC and to allow us to react to any new or innovative ambush marketing techniques. A flexible approach to the regulatory regime under the clause means that we can ensure that our regulations are fit for purpose.
Clause 18(1)(a) ensures that, in making regulations under clause 17, the Secretary of State can amend any existing legislation relating to control of advertising or intention. The clause relates to the fact that our regulations are likely to supersede the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertising) Regulations 1992, which provide the current regime of advertising control. We feel that we have to allow the Secretary of State, through the regulations, to amend any existing legislation controlling advertising to ensure that we do not create unhelpful loopholes by ignoring either existing rights or any advertising that is currently exempt from controls.
Amendments Nos. 66 and 72 would limit our ability to prevent unauthorised advertising. Subsections (4) and (5) of clause 17 are drafted to enable us to control all forms of advertising in the vicinity of the Olympic venues and to ensure that the Secretary of State has the flexibility to react to any innovations in the advertising industry in the coming years. If subsections (4)(a) and (b) and subsections (5)(a) to (c) of clause 17 were removed, the Secretary of State might be hampered in reacting to any new forms of ambush marketing. Amendments Nos. 66 and 72 would mean that we were not able to prevent the mass distribution of leaflets, placards or free gifts—examples of ambush marketing that have affected previous games—in the vicinity of the Olympic venues.
The hon. Member for Bath said that newspapers might come within the ambit of the regulations. That is not our intention; we need the powers to protect against people handing out flyers, placards and free gifts, as I have said. We will draft regulations that contain exemptions that follow those in current planning regulations, which include an exemption for newspapers—we shall make sure that newspapers are exempted in that secondary legislation. It is not our intention to cover newspapers in the way that the hon. Gentleman indicated.

Maria Miller: I remain a little concerned at the Minister’s response. I have no problem with the control of advertising, but do the Government intend to control other forms of communication? The Minister has said that he would exclude newspapers, but many other forms of communication could be affected. We were talking about billboards before, but there are also magazines, local radio and television. Will the Minister elaborate on those other forms of communication?

Richard Caborn: Another issue raised was the prospect of light and sound being used. We do not intend the regulations to cover television, but some innovations could, for example, project images on to buildings from outside the immediate vicinity of the Olympics, if that vicinity were limited to a few hundred yards. Furthermore, laser lights can be beamed in from a considerable distance away, and they might constitute advertising. We are trying to future-proof things so that we can take appropriate action without having to come back to the House and ask specifically for more powers.
New technologies are developing and there are some extremely innovative people out there. If we do not get the relevant powers now, we shall have to come back to the House to get them. The powers relate to areas on which we all agree. This is about protecting the rights of the IOC and trying to future-proof the Bill.

Don Foster: Again, the Minister is not helping much. If he were to say something like, “We intend to bring in regulations that cover the display by any means of any form of advertising in any media”, Committee members of all parties would be happy. We accept the need for controls on advertising. The problem is that  the definition of advertising in the clause goes far wider than the normally accepted definition. I accept that the regulations would have to get parliamentary approval, but the measure seems to widen the scope.
The Minister studies such things in great detail. I ask him to look at subsection (5) of clause 17 as an example of the breadth of the measure:
“The regulations may apply in respect of advertising in any form including ... things done with or in relation to material which has or may have purposes or uses other than as an advertisement.”
Therefore, subsection (5) contains an admission that the regulations will cover,
“in respect of advertising in any form”,
things that are not an advertisement. That is why we are confused.
There is also a reference to “notices of any kind”. I can think of 101 different kinds of notice. To publish somebody’s banns of marriage is to give a notice; what is the Secretary of State going to do about that?
The Minister says that newspapers will not be covered. I am grateful to have that firmly put on the record. Presumably, he will also agree that the advertisement on a news vendor’s stand will not be covered; can he at least agree that that will be the case? The Evening Standard news vendor’s stand display will not be covered by the regulations; can the Minister simply say yes or no to that?

Richard Caborn: The answer to that is no, that will not be banned. I do not remember there being all this debate when the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 was being passed, and the definitions in this Bill are very similar to those in that Act. A tremendous amount of knowledge and know-how has come out of the application of that Act, and out of what has happened in previous Olympic games, and we have encapsulated that in this Bill.
Measures such as this will be interpreted proportionately, and with common sense. The hon. Gentleman asked about someone wanting to advertise their newspaper. I repeat what I have said: we will exclude newspapers. Newspapers advertise, so will we ban advertising in newspapers that are sold outside Olympic venues? No, that would be stupid.
I am trying to inject an element of common sense into the debate. I say again that we are trying to reflect what the IOC is asking us to do, and we will do that. We are also trying to future-proof. We have taken the basis of this part of the Bill from the 1990 Act, which has worked well to date and which I have no doubt will work from now to 2012. All we are trying to do is make sure both that we respond to the demands made by the IOC and that that is done proportionately and, I hope, with an element of common sense.
There is nothing to fear in this part of the Bill. If anything, what it does is protect the House, because these matters will have to come back before the House time and again between now and 2012.

Don Foster: The Minister knows that in broad terms I agree with his approach. I want him to be proportionate, to use common sense, and there to be future-proofing. However, he must realise that we are  debating the words in the legislation before us, not those that the Minister is uttering, and I maintain that I still do not know, because he has not given me an example, of anything that, for example, is advertising that has
“purposes ... other than as an advertisement.”
I simply do not understand that.
I am asking the Minister to help me, but he is clearly not in particularly helpful mode at present. However, I have no doubt that we will have an opportunity to return to these issues at a later stage of our deliberations, so rather than try to—
Mr. Cabornrose—

Don Foster: Instead of doing what I was about to do, I will give way to the Minister.

Richard Caborn: I just want to try to give the hon. Gentleman an idea of what the IOC is asking us to deliver. That is contained in my handout this morning. He has obviously not read it, and I can understand why. It states:
“Clean venues refer to the status of all competition and non-competition venues being rendered free of commercial, political or religious advertising and messaging, leaving only the Look of the Games and approved Games sponsors presence. This is one of the key differentiating factors that the Olympic Games offer as compared to other events to athletes, spectators and the worldwide broadcast audience.”
Therefore—[Interruption.] Let me respond to the question the hon. Gentleman has just asked. If some people wanted to hold a religious meeting outside an Olympic venue, or if the Liberal party wanted to go and protest there and advertise its wares—if it has any to advertise—they can go and demonstrate there. We will be able to take certain actions in some circumstances, such as if the local Liberal party were advertising its meetings outside an Olympic venue. If one wants to get more and more daft, one can keep on bringing those type of examples up. It is trite to cater for all eventualities.

Don Foster: I did not understand a word of that, but never mind. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 - Offence

Don Foster: I beg to move amendment No. 16, in page 14, line 3, leave out subsection (2).
We are back to advertising. Subsection (2) contradicts the concept that everyone in this country and certainly our courts hold dear: the principle of innocence until proven guilty. The Government seem to be willing to sacrifice that long-standing principle in respect of advertising and replace it with the presumption of guilt. I am certainly not suggesting that the general aim of clause 19 is misguided.  Notwithstanding my worry about what the regulations might cover, it should be an offence to contravene any of the advertising regulations under clause 17. When they are agreed by Parliament in due course, clearly, such activity should be an offence. I am as committed as anyone to stopping inappropriate advertising and to ensuring that we can fulfil the guarantees made to the IOC about it, but I genuinely find it hard to believe that it is imperative when achieving such results to overturn the usual procedure of innocence until proven guilty to what seems to be a dangerous presumption of guilt.
I raised the issue in advance of our deliberations with the Department, LOCOG and many other organisations. They have tried to help me and have explained why the matter is important, but so far I am not with them. I hope that the Minister’s help will be more effective than that which I have received so far. I wish to give him the opportunity to clarify why such a measure is necessary. However, I want first to remind him that he made it clear in the explanatory notes that accompany the Bill that the Secretary of State considers that the clause is compatible with the European convention on human rights. Paragraph 110 of the explanatory notes argues that clauses 19 is
“consistent with the presumption of innocence particularly as the matters subject to the reverse burden are matters within the knowledge of the defendant and which would be difficult for the prosecution to prove.”
 That advice is meant to be part of an explanatory note. It says that, when we have the reversal of the usual approach to presumption of innocence, we do not have it. It then goes on to explain the reason for that, as a result of which I become completely lost.
We seem to be reversing the long-held belief of innocence until proven guilty. The explanatory notes say that such action is not being taken, but clearly it is. I have not the foggiest notion why that should be so. I could quote several examples from certain organisations, but I thought that it would be better to hear what the Minister has to say first, after which I might come back with a few comments about what others think about the proposal.

Maria Miller: The Opposition share the concerns of the hon. Member for Bath about clause 19. While it is true that there are other areas of law when there is an automatic presumption of guilt, most notably in money laundering regulations, it is entirely disproportionate that there should be a presumption of guilt about people who find themselves, perhaps even inadvertently, in breach of clause 17. Given our earlier discussions and the broadness and vagueness of some of the notions that were talked about, several people could fall into that category.
In addition to the worries that were expressed by the hon. Gentleman about clause 19(2), we believe that it would not be good to normalise further the use of presumption of guilt under English common law. In our view, the inclusion of presumption of guilt in legislation should be used as infrequently as possible.  I am interested to hear from the Minister why it is considered necessary to reverse the burden of proof in this instance.
I noticed in the handout that the Minister kindly gave to Committee members this morning that the IOC technical manual shows that it may cover the issue, although not in a great amount of detail. I urge the Minister to realise that the IOC is used to working with many different countries with strong principles regarding the issue, which are enshrined in their legislation. Perhaps we should not be too ready to give way on this issue, which is important and a matter of principle for us.

Richard Caborn: I will try to explain why we have included this provision in the Bill. Amendment No. 16 would remove the reverse burden of proof in relation to criminal offences that we have created under our new regime for controlling advertising in and around the Olympic venues. I understand the spirit in which the amendment is tabled, but it is appropriate, and indeed proportionate, that the burden of proof falls on the defendant in this case.
Subsection (2) provides a crucial defence for anyone charged with an offence under an advertising regime. Those defences are right and proper and must remain. The burden of proof is on the defendant because the subject matter of the defence is so closely conditioned by the defendant’s own knowledge. We feel that it is more appropriate for the burden to fall on the defendant. Our approach is consistent with the case of Sheldrake v. DPP, which essentially sets the bounds of acceptability in relation to reverse burdens of proof. Our approach also closely follows the type of defence available under section 224 of the Town and Country Planning Act, which provides an offence in breach of advertising restrictions imposed under the Act. In this specific case, we believe that there is an argument for reversing that burden of proof because of the knowledge of the individual.

Don Foster: I am grateful to the Minister. I fundamentally disagree with him, but the Government are entitled to their view. We are talking about fines that will be greater than those usually applied by magistrates and a possible criminal record. Clearly, the full force should be applied to those who intend to commit such crime, but the provision could place a huge burden on many small businesses that may inadvertently do things with no intention to create a connection. Nevertheless, I accept that the Minister feels strongly about the issue. Therefore, I ask him to explain paragraph 110 of the explanatory notes, where it says:
“Clause 19 places a ‘reverse burden’ of proof on the defendant to prove that they did not know that they were committing an offence in relation to the advertising regulations, or took all reasonable steps to avoid doing so.”
It is difficult to see how that could be done in some circumstances. It continues:
“This is consistent with the presumption of innocence, particularly as the matters subject to the reverse burden are matters within the knowledge of the defendant and which would be difficult for the prosecution to prove.”
Would the Minister explain to me the phrase
“This is consistent with the presumption of innocence”?
How can there be a “reverse burden” in the first sentence that is consistent with the presumption of innocence in the second? Will he at least acknowledge that there is an error in the explanatory notes, or is there some other way of explaining two mutually incompatible phrases?

Richard Caborn: If the hon. Gentleman reflects on the examples of already existing case law and the Town and Country Planning Act, he will find that they are consistent with the explanatory notes. I accept what the hon. Gentleman says about the application of the law in general, but we are talking about a specific area. I can reassure him with some justification on the basis of what has happened during previous Olympic games. If we found an innocent person in a shop somewhere acting in a way contradictory to the provisions and their case was genuine, no court in this land would prosecute them. Actions would be taken, but not by prosecution. We would ask them to stop the activity.
We are considering a relatively short time—the run-up to the Olympic games—and seeking to protect those who are investing huge amounts of money. This is not about changing case law; we are basing our planning on what happens now. We must apply some common sense. I cannot believe that we shall haul before the courts a little old lady who has a shop somewhere because she has used some words that are out of synch with what we are saying. It is ludicrous to think that. This measure is not about that sort of thing; it is aimed at those who want commercially to exploit the 2012 Olympic games. We know what happens at major sporting events—we shall come to ticket touting in a while. We are concerned with catching people who want to make a fast buck out of 2012, not those who advertise legitimately, who exploit the games in the right way, and from whom we receive benefit. That is the situation that we are seeking to protect; we are not going after the little granny who owns the sweet shop at the bottom of the road, in order to haul her before the courts. That would be crazy.

Don Foster: I am inordinately grateful. Once the Minister gets passionate—we all love to hear him—he puts on record words that are enormously important for the future. Lots of grannies up and down the land will be very grateful to know what he has just said, and for the protection that he has just offered them. I will leave the matter there, but I should like the Minister to reflect on why I still have cause for concern, notwithstanding anything that he has said.
I understand the Minister’s motivation, but what he has said could equally apply to almost any other offence in the lexicon of the laws of this land. It is not our intention to prosecute somebody who did not do anything. However, we should consider paragraph 110 of the explanatory notes, which specifically says:
 “This is consistent with the presumption of innocence, particularly as the matters subject to the reverse burden are matters within the knowledge of the defendant and which would be difficult for the prosecution to prove.”
The point is that we are proposing a reverse burden approach because it will be difficult for the prosecution to prove anything. We could have that argument about any law. One is guilty until one is proved innocent. That is not the way that I think it should be, and I still have not heard a convincing reason from the Minister. He could use the argument that he has used here in relation to any case, so I hope that we will have an opportunity to come back to the matter at a later stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment by leave withdrawn.
Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20 - Enforcement: power of entry

Richard Caborn: I beg to move amendment No. 74, in page 14, line 21, leave out
‘on other land or premises);’
and insert ‘elsewhere);’.
The amendment ensures that enforcement officers have the powers that they need to prevent unauthorised advertising. At present, clause 20(1)(a) gives enforcement officers the power to enter land in order to prevent unauthorised advertising—including land adjacent to the area where the regulations apply, where a projector has been set up to project images on to land or buildings within the regulated area. However, the clause presently excludes any right of entry or enforcement power where the projector does not project on to other land or buildings but into the sky. We need to close that loophole, so that enforcement officers are not left powerless to act against people who project prominent, unauthorised advertising into the night sky around the Olympic venues.

Hugh Robertson: I have three quick questions for the Minister about this clause. The first is that, clearly, it governs the establishment of enforcement officers and their powers of entry. Is the Minister in a position to tell the Committee, on the basis of previous games, what size of enforcement—

David Amess: Order. I advise the hon. Gentleman that if he wants to debate the clause, he will have an opportunity to do so on clause stand part. However, he must wait until the Minister has dealt with his amendment.

Hugh Robertson: Thank you.

Amendment agreed to.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Hugh Robertson: Thank you, Mr. Amess. There are three items on which we should welcome some assurance from the Minister. First, can he tell us, on the basis of the experience either in Athens or Sydney, what size the enforcement force will be? How many people are likely to be involved in it? Secondly, how precisely will it co-operate with the police in bringing prosecutions? Thirdly, I should like to confirm what I  was told at some stage in a briefing on the matter, that the force would be funded by LOCOG. Can the Minister confirm that, and that the cost will not fall on the London taxpayer?

Richard Caborn: I am not in a position this morning to answer those questions specifically, but I can write to the hon. Gentleman and ensure that all three answers are put on to the public record.

Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21 - Role of Olympic Delivery Authority

Richard Caborn: I beg to move amendment No. 49, in page 16, line 18, at end insert—
‘(3A)The Olympic Delivery Authority may institute criminal proceedings in respect of an offence under section 19.
(3B)Subsection (3A) shall not apply in relation to the institution of proceedings in Scotland or Northern Ireland.’.

David Amess: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 50.

Richard Caborn: Regulations made to restrict advertising under clause 19, and street trading under clause 25, will create new offences that need to be prosecuted. Local authorities will be able to prosecute, just as they now prosecute similar offences, such as fly-posting. However, there will be a large number of different authorities involved, with a range of other priorities.
Amendment No. 49 would give the Olympic Delivery Authority the specific power of prosecution in relation to clause 19 offences. Amendment No. 50 would give the ODA the specific power of prosecution in relation to clause 25. That should provide a single-focus, co-ordinated approach to prosecutions across Olympic sites throughout England and Wales for the period of the games.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 21, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 22 to 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26 - Enforcement: power of entry

Richard Caborn: I beg to move amendment No. 75, in clause 26, page 19, line 25, at end insert—
‘(3A)An article removed—
(a)if removed by an enforcement officer, shall as soon as is reasonably practicable be delivered to a constable, and
(b)whether removed by or delivered to a constable, shall be treated as if acquired by the constable in the course of the investigation of an offence;
but this subsection is subject to subsection (3).’.
The amendment is a necessary addition to our enforcement powers in relation to street trading. Under clause 26(3) we have provided that, where an enforcement officer removes any article in order to prevent further trading, or for evidence in any potential court proceedings, there is provision to ensure that such articles are returned in a timely and appropriate fashion, where the reasons for seizure no longer justify retention. In addition to those powers, the amendment ensures that where enforcement officers—as opposed to police officers—seize goods, they are required to pass the goods to police as soon as possible. That is to ensure that the Police Property Act applies. That Act provides a procedure whereby the police may apply to dispose of or return seized property, or individuals may reclaim property. That procedure is particularly useful where the ODA, enforcement officers or the police do not have the details of the rightful owner of property, or where there appears to be a question mark over such ownership.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 26, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27 - Role of Olympic Delivery Authority

Amendment made: No. 50, in clause 27, page 20, line 27, at end insert—
‘(3A)The Olympic Delivery Authority may institute criminal proceedings in respect of an offence under section 25.
(3B)Subsection (3A) shall not apply in relation to the institution of proceedings in Scotland or Northern Ireland.’.—[Mr. Caborn.]

Clause 27, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29 - Sale of Tickets

Don Foster: As subsequent Government amendments cover the same point as amendment No. 12 and are more effective, I shall not proceed with it.

Richard Caborn: I beg to move amendment No. 97, in clause 29, page 21, line 23, at end insert—
‘(3A)A person does not commit an offence under subsection (1) (whether actual or inchoate) only by virtue of making facilities available in connection with electronic communication or the storage of electronic data.
(3B)Where a person who provides services for electronic communication or for the storage of electronic data discovers that they are being used in connection with the commission of an offence under subsection (1), the defence in subsection (3A) does not apply in respect of continued provision of the services after the shortest time reasonably required to withdraw them.’.

David Amess: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 98.

Richard Caborn: Amendment No. 98 provides that the offence of ticket touting in clause 29 may be committed outside the UK. The intention is to target internet touting in particular and to provide a deterrent against those minded to move their unlawful business offshore to evade liability.
Amendment No. 97 clarifies the position in relation to ticket touting via the internet. It provides internet service providers with defences to ensure that they are not accused unfairly of being an accessory to our new ticket touting offence, while also ensuring that the defences do not allow web companies to turn a blind eye to offences that are being committed via their sites.
Such defences are required to provide effective implementation of the e-commerce directive, and are therefore required to ensure that clause 29 complies with EU law. These defences strike the right balance by ensuring that certain internet companies will not be found guilty of an offence when they have unwittingly advertised tickets for sale or have facilitated the sale of tickets, but such companies must act expeditiously to remove any information from their site that contravenes clause 29 in order to avoid liability.
We believe that the amendment strikes an appropriate balance between cracking down on people who simply turn a blind eye to offences that they are helping to facilitate, and ensuring that responsible service providers are not unfairly penalised.

Amendment agreed to.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Hugh Robertson: I shall take a few moments of the Committee’s time to explore with the Minister the question of ticket touting, not least because several organisations, which he will know, have approached me and the hon. Member for Bath, as I am sure they have approached the Minister, about the question of ticket touting in the run-up to the 2012 Olympics and the effect that it has on other sports.
The Minister will be aware that there are some very powerful arguments in favour of a more general ban than the one proposed in the Bill. There is the question of security. He will know that the cricket authorities are very worried about the security of some of the touring teams that are due to come to these shores in the next few years. There is also the question of public order and extra policing outside the ground, and of the cost to the national governing bodies of sport that must police ticket touting because it is not yet illegal.
There is also the knock-on effect that ticket touting has on the availability of tickets for real fans. I am told that there is now a very considerable industry whereby firms speed dial and hold the numbers when tickets are released on the market, thereby denying access to ordinary sports fans.
We should also consider the proceeds of crime. The National Criminal Intelligence Service reports that ticket touts are very often part of a much wider criminal operation, and the four sport consortia reckon that ticket touting is now part of a vast organised criminal business. I am told that it can  account for some £100 million a year, and that more than 2.2 million tickets worldwide now exchange hands on the black market. Clearly, anyone buying those tickets suffers from a total lack of guarantee over the security of the purchase. Indeed, the practice is outlawed in Scotland. This is not the time for a wider debate, but I wish to tease out the Minister’s thoughts and those of his Department on whether, in view of the fact that the argument has been accepted for the London 2012 Olympics, we need to consider preparing the way for widening the regulations.

Patrick McFadden: I am sure that the Committee supports the aim of clause 29, which is to ensure that tickets are sold properly and honestly, and that they go to genuine sports fans. The last thing we want is for the Olympic games to be supported by the entire country but for the tickets to be sold in a way that dilutes or erodes that support.
The Minister will be familiar with some of the practices of ticket touts. They do not necessarily ask a huge price for the ticket, but may offer a tee-shirt or scarf for a large sum and an ostensibly free ticket. I understand that the clause deals with that problem, not allowing such practices in the selling of Olympic tickets. However, given that we are acting to protect tickets for the games, we have the opportunity to consider some of the touting practices that take place at UK events outwith the Olympics but in Olympic sports.
Would it not be a contradiction to take preventive and protective measures for Olympic sports at the Olympic games but to allow such practices to take place at other events? Given that the Minister’s Department is rightly acting to protect the Olympic games, I ask him to elaborate a little on how he proposes dealing with non-Olympic events.

Richard Caborn: Hon. Members were right to say that we have received representations from many sports. The Secretary of State is hosting a meeting on 10 November to talk about ticket touting. We want to start a dialogue between the various sports.
Ticket touting is a problem not only for sport: it goes on beyond sport. That is another matter that will have to be factored into a review of the law; we have not ruled it out. What we are doing for the IOC has been forced upon us; that is what we are dealing with now, and I have no doubt that it will be good experience for us when responding to what my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-East said about other sporting events and the wider issue of ticket touting.
There is no doubt that touting happens. One only has to look at the prices on eBay for tickets to the last test match to see what goes on. It was the first time that tickets had sold out for all five days, and tickets for the fifth day were getting huge prices on eBay. From my point of view, as a Sports Minister, that money is going out of the game. A lot of that money would have gone back into the game if the extra money paid for the tickets had been part of the game’s revenue stream.
We have to explore a number of areas to ensure that the fan—the punter—and the sports get a fair deal. Touting is exploitation, but the money does not go back into sport. It needs serious consideration. We will start that dialogue on 10 November by responding to some of the representations that have been made. We have to move forward, and I hope that that dialogue will pave the way for further legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 29, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 - Olympic symbol protection

Richard Caborn: I beg to move amendment No. 76, in schedule 2, page 33, line 23, leave out ‘in the course’ and insert ‘as a necessary incident’.

David Amess: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 77 to 82.

Richard Caborn: The changes that clause 30 and schedule 2 make to the Olympic Symbol etc. (Protection) Act 1995—the OSPA—are crucial to ensure that the intellectual property of the Olympics and Paralympics is appropriately protected. The OSPA creates an Olympic association right as the principal means of protecting Olympic intellectual property.
The amendments provide more clarity on the defences available to people when using protected Olympic words and symbols, and better define the concept of association in that context. The amendments largely arise from our discussions with the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising, the British Olympic Association and other interested stakeholders over the summer.
Government amendment No. 82 helps to provide more clarity on the concept of association in the context of the Olympic association right. For example, it points towards the idea of someone creating a commercial or contractual link or other demonstration of support between a person, product or service and the Olympic games or movement as something that would infringe the association right. That is the sort of exploitation of the games that we must prevent if we are to meet our obligations to the IOC to combat ambush marketing, and if the organising committee is to raise sufficient revenues to fund the games. We hope that the amendment provides greater clarity on the concept of association and the type of mischief that we are trying to prevent.
Government amendment No. 82 also provides more clarity for people who have a legitimate right to use a protected word. That might include a bus company offering a service from Hull to London to allow people  to go and watch the sporting competition in the summer of 2012. That company must be allowed to refer to the fact that it is running services from Hull to the Olympic park. As a result, paragraph (b)(i) provides a defence for people who use protected words when making statements that accord with honest commercial practice. However, paragraph (b)(ii) prevents the gratuitous use of Olympic words. For example, we want to prevent people from using Olympic words and symbols in a context and a manner in which they would not ordinarily be used. That is to deal with people who are obviously using Olympic words only as a means of commercially exploiting the games and not in the course of legitimately advertising their product or service.
The final part of Government amendment No. 82 provides the Secretary of State with the power by order to clarify the concept of association. As has become evident during our consultation with interested stakeholders, in drafting the Bill and in debate today, the precise nature of association and what should constitute a legitimate defence for the use of controlled words are by no means straightforward. We think it prudent to give the Secretary of State the power to introduce amendments to the concept of association. Such an order would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Therefore, if it proves necessary to use such a power, it will be subject to the sort of constructive debate that we have had on the Bill.
Government amendments Nos. 76 to 79 clarify the defences available to people in using controlled words or symbols, particularly in relation to journalistic use. Government amendment No. 76 is designed to allow appropriate use of OSPA words and symbols in news reporting. In particular, the defence is designed to ensure that journalists can publish reports about the Olympics, whether they are reports on the sporting competition or details of cultural festivals or other events associated with the games. However, the amendment also ensures that the journalistic defence cannot be exploited and it protects against gratuitous use of Olympic words and symbols.
Government amendment No. 77 ensures that the journalistic defence for the use of Olympic words or symbols is not simply limited to retrospective news reporting. We were concerned that the drafting of the original provision in schedule 2 meant that people who, for example, produced programmes for the events of the London games or reported on an athlete’s preparation for the games would not have a defence available to them. That was certainly not our policy intention, and the amendment is designed to clarify the situation.
While speaking about journalistic reporting, I should also make it clear that a current affairs programme about the Olympic movement will not create an association as defined here. Journalists working on such programmes will therefore be able to rely on the defence in paragraph 4(2).
Government amendment No. 79 makes a consequential amendment in the light of Government amendments Nos. 76 and 77. It creates a defence for using OSPA protected words and symbols in  advertising any journalistic work as described in Government amendments Nos. 76 and 77—for example, news reporting about or in preparation for the Olympics. The amendment also removes the defence in respect of using Olympic words in advertising an artistic or literary work under paragraph 4(1)(b). That is simply because if use of a protected word in a literary work is truly incidental, it should not find its way into an advertisement for that work. However, appropriate incidental use in the context of an advertisement will in any event be permitted by paragraph 4(1)(b).
Government amendment No. 80 ensures that the symbols as well as the words are caught by the defence in paragraph 4(2). Although it will rarely be the case that the use of the symbol will not create an association, we felt it was necessary to provide a defence for those rare exceptions.
Government amendment No. 78 makes the offence in paragraph 4(1)(b) consistent with other intellectual property law. In particular, it imports the definition of artistic and literary works and so on from the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and Government amendment No. 81 simply makes the drafting in the defence in paragraph 4(2) more precise.

Maria Miller: The Minister clearly identified the need to provide a tighter definition of “association” in the amendment, and attempted to include a definition of it. I admit that that goes some way to help to clarify the Bill’s intention. However, the Bill still includes an automatic infringement with a presumption of guilt for the use of words that are loosely associated with the Olympics. We shall cover that more fully under the amendments that we have tabled to schedule 3, but it is worth pointing out that there is a need for more clarity. I am not sure whether this amendment is entirely consistent with other amendments to schedule 3.
I remain concerned that we could inadvertently stifle the economic and social benefits that could accrue from the Olympics, and I am sure that that is not the Government’s intention. I again stress the fact that we understand the need to protect sponsorship value, but there is a question of balance. My concern is that risk-averse organisations that perhaps do not have access to extensive legal advice to unpick some of the words in the amendment could be put off overtly supporting the games. We need a more transparent approach, which we shall introduce under schedule 3, and an approach more in line with the Sydney Olympic experience, which was successful in tackling ambush marketing.
Perhaps after we have had a little more time to consider the elements of the technical document we have been given today, the Minister may want to comment more fully on a couple of points that were raised about specific association rights. The document states:
“Legislation should provide for the protection of the Olympic permanent marks ... as well as for the ‘CITY + YEAR’”.
It is specific about what needs to be protected, and we should take that into consideration. The document also states that
“it is not the intention of the IOC to overreach and/or to prevent uses of marks, imagery or designations that have nothing to do with the Olympic Games.”
The IOC is giving us a bit of leeway to be more specific, and perhaps the amendment could better take account of that.

Don Foster: I wish to echo the hon. Lady’s words. Although we are grateful for the amendments to paragraph 4—they give greater clarification of the Government’s intention—there is still a concern among many people that the commitment that the Government made at the time of the bid and the commitment that has been given subsequently that everyone in the country would benefit from the Olympic games may not be delivered, if we are not careful. It is worth recalling that, only a few days ago, in a speech entitled, “We can all be winners from 2012”, the Secretary of State said:
“My message is simple—we can all be winners from the Games coming to Britain. Anything is possible for those who go for it. Businesses, the trade union movement and local communities need to start thinking now about how they seize the commercial opportunities the 2012 Games will provide. We are committed to ensuring that every region of the country benefits from the Olympic Games”.
It is crucial that the Minister acknowledge what the Secretary of State said.
Although I genuinely understand the concerns, it worries me that some of the briefing notes from LOCOG, for instance, talk about ambush marketers who will
“feed off the goodwill and public excitement about the event, so as to enhance demand for the brand”.
LOCOG calls such marketing activities “parasitic”. I accept that there is a fine line between making sure that we protect the rights of sponsors, so that they are prepared to be sponsors, and ensuring that everyone else has the opportunity to benefit from the Olympics. I remain to be convinced that we have not stepped too far and gone on to the wrong side of that line. If we are not careful, the commitment given by the Secretary of State that we can all be winners from 2012 will not be delivered.

Richard Caborn: I understand what hon. Members are saying, but I think that we have struck the right balance. We have taken on board what has been said. As I mentioned, the amendments have largely arisen from discussions with the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising and the British Olympic Association. We have taken their concerns on board, and they are reflected in the amendments. If the amendments are accepted, we will have struck the right balance. I acknowledge what the hon. Gentleman says, but we have taken third party advice and brought the resulting amendments before the Committee. Obviously, we will listen to what people say. There is  further action to be taken in the Bill, as we will soon see, but we have got the balance about right at the moment.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 77, in schedule 2, page 33, line 24, at end insert—
‘(aa)as a necessary incident of publishing or broadcasting information about the Olympic Games,’.
No. 78, in schedule 2, page 33, line 25, leave out
‘an artistic work, sound recording, film or broadcast,’
and insert
‘a literary work, dramatic work, artistic work, sound recording, film or broadcast, within the meaning of Part I of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (c. 48) (copyright),’.
No. 79, in schedule 2, page 33, line 27, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—
‘(c)as an inclusion in an advertisement for a publication or broadcast of a kind described in paragraph (a) or (aa).’.
No. 80, in schedule 2, page 33, line 30, leave out ‘protected word’ and insert ‘controlled representation’.
No. 81, in schedule 2, page 33, line 31, leave out ‘with’ and insert
‘between a person, product or service and’.
No. 82, in schedule 2, page 33, line 31, at end insert
‘; and for the purpose of this subsection—
(a)the concept of an association between a person, product or service and the Olympic Games or the Olympic movement includes, in particular—
(i)any kind of contractual relationship,
(ii)any kind of commercial relationship,
(iii)any kind of corporate or structural connection, and
(iv)the provision by a person of financial or other support for or in connection with the Olympic Games or the Olympic movement, but
(b)a person does not suggest an association with the Olympic Games or the Olympic movement only by making a statement which—
(i)accords with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters, and
(ii)does not make promotional or other commercial use of a protected word by incorporating it in a context to which the Olympic Games and the Olympic movement are substantively irrelevant.
(2A)The Secretary of State may by order specify what is to be or not to be treated for the purposes of subsection (2) as an association between a person, product or service and the Olympic Games or the Olympic movement; and an order under this subsection—
(a)may include incidental, consequential or transitional provision (which may include provision amending subsection (2)(a) or (b)),
(b)shall be made by statutory instrument, and
(c)may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.’.—[Mr. Caborn.]

Richard Caborn: I beg to move amendment No. 83, in schedule 2, page 35, line 16, at end insert—
‘Infringement 9AIn section 7(3)(a) (orders in relation to infringing goods: “infringing material”) for “, or for advertising goods or services,” substitute “, for advertising goods or services or by being displayed,”.’.  The amendment removes an anomaly from the Olympic Symbol etc. (Protection) Act 1995. At present, a person infringes the BOA’s right if, in contravention of section 3 of that Act, he or she uses a protected word or symbol in a banner or flag. However, the definition of “infringing material” in section (7)(3) does not include such banners or displays. Our amendment simply means that the court orders permitted by section 7 of the Act, such as those relating to the delivering up of goods or the erasure of infringing signs, can now apply to flags or banners using protected words or symbols that infringe the BOA’s right. Amendment agreed to.
9AIn section 7(3)(a) (orders in relation to infringing goods: “infringing material”) for “, or for advertising goods or services,” substitute “, for advertising goods or services or by being displayed,”.’.
The amendment removes an anomaly from the Olympic Symbol etc. (Protection) Act 1995. At present, a person infringes the BOA’s right if, in contravention of section 3 of that Act, he or she uses a protected word or symbol in a banner or flag. However, the definition of “infringing material” in section (7)(3) does not include such banners or displays. Our amendment simply means that the court orders permitted by section 7 of the Act, such as those relating to the delivering up of goods or the erasure of infringing signs, can now apply to flags or banners using protected words or symbols that infringe the BOA’s right.

Amendment agreed to.

Richard Caborn: I beg to move amendment No. 48, in schedule 2, page 35, line 25, at end insert—
‘Enforcement 11(1)After section 8 add— “8AEnforcement by trading standards authority (1)A local weights and measures authority may enforce within their area the provisions of section 8. (2)The following provisions of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 apply in relation to the enforcement of that section as in relation to the enforcement of that Act— (a)section 27 (power to make test purchases), (b)section 28 (power to enter premises and inspect and seize goods and documents),
11(1)After section 8 add—
“8AEnforcement by trading standards authority
(1)A local weights and measures authority may enforce within their area the provisions of section 8.
(2)The following provisions of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 apply in relation to the enforcement of that section as in relation to the enforcement of that Act—
(a)section 27 (power to make test purchases),
(c)section 29 (obstruction of authorised officers), and
(d)section 33 (compensation for loss, &c of goods seized).
(3)Subsection (1) above does not apply in relation to the enforcement of section 8 in Northern Ireland; but—
(a)the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment may enforce that section in Northern Ireland, and
(b)for that purpose the provisions of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 specified in subsection (2) apply as if for the references to a local weights and measures authority and any officer of such an authority there were substituted references to that Department and any of its officers.
(4)Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorising a local weights and measures authority to bring proceedings in Scotland for an offence.”
(2)The London Organising Committee may—
(a)make arrangements with a local weights and measures authority for the exercise of the authority’s power under section 8 of the Olympic Symbol etc. (Protection) Act 1995 (as inserted by sub-paragraph (1));
(b)may make payments to a local weights and measures authority in respect of expenses incurred in the exercise of that power.
12After section 8A (inserted by paragraph 11 above) insert—
“8BArrest
(1)After paragraph 21 of Schedule 1A to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (arrestable offences) add—
“Olympic Symbol etc. (Protection) Act 1995 21AAn offence under section 8 of the Olympic Symbol etc. (Protection) Act 1995 (offences in relation to goods).” (2)A constable in Scotland may arrest without warrant a person who the constable reasonably believes is committing or has committed an offence under section 8 of the Olympic Symbol etc. (Protection) Act 1995. (3)Subsection (2) is without prejudice to any power of arrest which is otherwise exercisable by a constable in Scotland.”.’. The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 45 and 42 to 44.
21AAn offence under section 8 of the Olympic Symbol etc. (Protection) Act 1995 (offences in relation to goods).”
(2)A constable in Scotland may arrest without warrant a person who the constable reasonably believes is committing or has committed an offence under section 8 of the Olympic Symbol etc. (Protection) Act 1995.
(3)Subsection (2) is without prejudice to any power of arrest which is otherwise exercisable by a constable in Scotland.”.’.

David Amess: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 45 and 42 to 44.

Richard Caborn: These amendments are necessary to ensure that our law enforcement agencies have a full range of powers available to them in order successfully to crack down on people who seek to exploit the games through trading in merchandise that infringes the Olympic Symbol etc. (Protection) Act 1995.
Government amendment No. 45 provides Customs and Revenue officers with enforcement powers in relation to OSPA-infringing goods entering the UK. In effect, the amendment brings Customs officers’ powers in relation to counterfeit Olympic goods in line with their existing powers for detaining other goods that are intellectual property infringements. Providing Customs officers with such powers of detention is important if we are successfully to crack down on people who attempt to import and to sell counterfeit Olympic merchandise. Customs officers will be the first line of defence against counterfeit goods entering the country and we think that this is an important and appropriate addition to our armoury to combat those who seek unfairly to exploit the games.
The amendments create a dual system whereby HMRC officers can seize OSPA-infringing goods. First, as set out in new section 12A(1), HMRC officers will be able to detain counterfeit OSPA goods when LOCOG or the British Olympic Association provide HMRC officers with notice in writing of consignments entering the country that they believe to contain OSPA-infringing articles. Secondly, subsection (8) of new section 12A provides that, if HMRC discovers items during its ordinary course of business—and not as a result of notice from LOCOG or the BOA—which it suspects are counterfeit, it may also detain those goods.
The remaining subsections of new section 12A set out in detail how the provisions will work in practice. That includes, in subsections (4) and (8), details of how the proprietor and the importer will be informed of any seizure, as well as details of the information that HMRC can pass on to LOCOG. The new section also provides HMRC with powers to provide LOCOG with samples of any seized items to help it to determine whether seized goods are infringing the provisions.
The new section includes details of the time limits by which proceedings have to be brought by LOCOG in relation to any OSPA-infringing goods. That ensures that the HMRC can detain items only for a reasonable period, in line with its powers of detention in relation to other trademark goods. New section 12A also creates a criminal offence for any inappropriate onward disclosure of data LOCOG has received from HMRC. That provision ensures that HMRC can provide LOCOG with the necessary information about the importer or owner of the counterfeit goods, but it also ensures that the information gateway is strictly and tightly controlled.
Amendment No. 48 provides trading standards officers with clear enforcement powers in relation to the OSPA. Trading standards officers will be crucial in preventing the sale of counterfeit merchandise. Clarifying trading standards officers’ powers is therefore a necessary and sensible step. The amendment provides trading standards officers with  the power to make test purchases, as well as giving them the power to enter premises and inspect and seize goods. In effect, we are bringing trading standards officers’ powers for OSPA-infringing articles largely into line with the powers that they hold in relation to other trademark infringing goods.
The amendment also creates an arrestable offence under the OSPA. The trade in counterfeit goods is a lucrative and, at times, highly organised business. This is not just about a market trader with a one-off set of dodgy T-shirts. Those who trade in counterfeit merchandise are often part of a worldwide criminal network. Making the offence arrestable gives trading standards officers the ability to call on the police to use their powers and expertise to crack down on offenders who may be part of an organised criminal gang.
In amendment No. 48, we clarify that LOCOG can fund the activity of trading standards officers. That is to ensure that trading standards officers receive the necessary funds to enable them to carry out extensive and effective enforcement action.
Amendments Nos. 42, 43 and 44 relate to the commencement and end dates of these provisions.

Don Foster: I have only one question about the dodgy T-shirt group of amendments, as the Minister described them. I am grateful to him for his explanation and to the Government for tabling these important amendments. He referred to the fact that the amendments—particularly amendment No. 48—give powers to trading standards officers or, as they are called, local weights and measures authorities, to take various actions. Will he clarify whether he understands his amendment to mean that such an authority can take action without a request from LOCOG? The provision currently states that LOCOG may make arrangements with trading standards officers and may make payments to them for their work. I hoped that trading standards officers or the authority would make the decision to carry on and to investigate such matters once they were given the powers. The slight problem is whether trading standards officers are going to sit back and wait for LOCOG to ask them to do something and get money for it in that way. Will the Minister explain how the money flows and whether, if trading standards officers get on and do something using the powers being given to them, they can go back to LOCOG and say, “We did it. Can we have some money?” I am not clear how it works.

Richard Caborn: If trading standards officers discovered in the normal course of their duties and actions that there was an infringement, obviously, they would act on that, but if LOCOG wants specifically to ask trading standards to take up extra work on surveillance over this period, which might be what is wanted, it will be quite legitimate for LOCOG to pay for that. Trading standards would report an infringement if they found one in the normal course of their duties, which would be paid for by their authorities. However, if extra surveillance were necessary—for example, at certain ports through which counterfeit articles could come into the country—LOCOG would ask trading standards to set  that up and it would pay for it. I hope that I have said the right thing. I have been passed a note that says that the authorities could take action but might need some financial help to combat the scale of the enforcement action needed.

Don Foster: Time is pressing, so I shall not delay. The point is that trading standards officers, who are a function of local government, will be given new powers for a relatively short time—although quite a long time during the run-up to the games; certainly longer than the period of the games—and will have additional duties to perform. Under normal circumstances, that would be reflected in the local government financial assessment in some way or other. Presumably, the Local Government Association will take up that issue.
I should like to be clear. The Minister seems to be saying that the trading standards officers will try to get money out of the local government financial settlement for their normal duties. If LOCOG wishes them to do something extra, they could get funding for that extra over and above their new powers. I think that the Minister said that. If he just says “yes”, we shall all be happy.

Richard Caborn: Yes.

Don Foster: Thanks.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 45, in schedule 2, page 35, line 25, at end insert—
‘13After section 12 (forfeiture) insert—
“12ADetention by Revenue and Customs
(1)The proprietor may give notice in writing to the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs—
(a)stating that at a time and place specified in the notice, goods which are infringing goods, material or articles are expected to arrive in the United Kingdom—
(i)from outside the European Economic Area, or
(ii)from within the Area but not having been entered for free circulation,
(b)specifying the nature of the controlled representation by reference to which the goods are infringing goods, material or articles, and
(c)requesting the Commissioners to detain the goods.
(2)The Commissioners may detain goods to which a notice under subsection (1) relates.
(3)But the Commissioners may not detain goods—
(a)imported by a person for his private and domestic use, or
(b)to which section 89(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 applies (Council Regulation 1383/2003/EC).
(4)If the Commissioners detain goods to which a notice under subsection (1) applies they shall as soon as is reasonably practicable—
(a)give written notice of the detention and the grounds for it to the person in whose name the goods were presented or declared to customs, and
(b)give the proprietor notice that the goods have been detained, specifying in respect of the goods such information as is available to the Commissioners about—
(i)the nature of the goods,
(ii)their number,
(iii)the place where they were manufactured,
(iv)the place from which they were sent,
(v)the name and address of the person by whom they were sent,
(vi)the name and address of the person mentioned in paragraph (a),
(vii)the name and address of the person to whom they were to be delivered, and
(viii)the name and address of the person who holds them during detention.
(5)The Commissioners may provide samples of detained goods to the proprietor on request, in which case he—
(a)may use the samples only for the purpose of determining whether they are infringing goods, material or articles,
(b)must return the samples to the Commissioners as soon as is reasonably practicable, and
(c)must inform the Commissioners as soon as is reasonably practicable whether the goods are infringing goods, material or articles.
(6)The Commissioners may permit the proprietor on request to inspect detained goods (in which case he must inform the Commissioners as soon as is reasonably practicable whether the goods are infringing goods, material or articles).
(7)The Commissioners shall release goods detained in pursuance of a notice under subsection (1) if—
(a)the Commissioners think that initiating process in proceedings under section 6 in respect of the goods has not been served during the period of 10 working days, in the case of non-perishable goods, or 3 working days, in the case of perishable goods, beginning with the date on which the notice under subsection (4)(b) was received,
(b)the Commissioners think that proceedings under section 6 in respect of the goods have been withdrawn, have lapsed or have terminated without an order being made in respect of the goods by virtue of section 7, or
(c)the Commissioners are informed by the proprietor that the goods are not infringing goods, material or articles.
(8)The Commissioners may detain goods which they think, having regard to the nature of the goods and to information provided by the proprietor, may be infringing goods, material or articles; and if the Commissioners detain goods under this subsection—
(a)they shall as soon as is reasonably practicable invite the proprietor to give the Commissioners a notice that the goods are infringing goods, material or articles,
(b)they shall, when giving an invitation under paragraph (a), give in respect of the goods such information as is available to them about—
(i)the nature of the goods,
(ii)their number,
(iii)the place where they were manufactured,
(iv)the place from which they were sent,
(v)the name and address of the person by whom they were sent,
(vi)the name and address of the person in whose name the goods were presented or declared to customs,
(vii)the name and address of the person to whom they were to be delivered, and
(viii)the name and address of the person who holds them during detention,
(c)they may provide samples of the goods to the proprietor on request in which case he —
(i)may use the samples only for the purpose of determining whether they are infringing goods, material or articles,
(ii)must return the samples to the Commissioners as soon as is reasonably practicable, and
(iii)must inform the Commissioners as soon as reasonably practicable whether the goods are infringing goods, material or articles,
(d)they may permit the proprietor on request to inspect the goods (in which case he must inform the Commissioners as soon as reasonably practicable whether the goods are infringing goods, material or articles),
(e)if no notice is given in accordance with paragraph (a) within the period of 3 working days beginning with the date on which the invitation under that paragraph is received, the Commissioners shall release the goods, and
(f)if a notice is given in accordance with paragraph (a), the Commissioners shall proceed as if it were a notice given under subsection (1) above (and as if the goods were detained in pursuance of that notice), but—
(i)subsections (4)(b), (5) and (6) shall not have effect, and
(ii)subsection (7) shall have effect as if the reference to the notice under subsection (4)(b) were a reference to information under paragraph (b) above.
12BSection 12A: supplementary
(1)Section 90 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (c. 26) (regulations as to form of notice, &c.) shall have effect in relation to a notice under subsection 12A(1) or (8)(a) above as in relation to a notice under section 89(1).
(2)A person who is or was an officer or employee of the proprietor, or who acts or acted on the proprietor’s behalf, commits an offence if he discloses information provided in accordance with section 12A(4)(b) or 12A(8)(b) other than—
(a)for the purpose of, or with a view to the institution of, proceedings under section 6,
(b)for the purpose of complying with an enactment,
(c)in pursuance of an order of a court,
(d)in a form which ensures that the identity of no person to whom the information relates is specified or can be deduced,
(e)with the consent of each person to whom the information relates, or
(f)with the consent of the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs;
and sections 19(3), (4), (7) and 55(1) of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (c. 11) (defences and penalties) shall have effect in relation to this subsection.
(3)Section 139(1), (2), (3), (4), (7) and (8) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (detention of goods: constables, &c.) shall apply in relation to goods liable to detention in accordance with section 12A above as in relation to things liable to forfeiture—
(a)with the substitution of a reference to this Act for a reference to the customs and excise Acts, and
(b)with any other necessary modifications.
(4)Section 144 of that Act (protection of officers) shall apply in relation to the detention of goods in accordance with section 12A above—
(a)with the substitution of a reference to proceedings under section 6 above for the reference in section 144(1) to proceedings for condemnation, and
(b)with any other necessary modifications.
(5)In section 12A “working day” means a day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday or a bank holiday (within the meaning of section 1 of the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 (c. 80)).”.’.—[Mr. Caborn.]

Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Further consideration adjourned—[Claire Ward.]

Adjourned at thirteen minutes to One o’clock till this day at Four o’clock.